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Years ago, one of the authors of this chapter was explaining an unusual idea to a close friend, 
and poetically admitted that the idea was “out there on the edge of the fabric of accepted reality”. 
The friend laughed and said, “You’re not just out there at the edge, you’re swinging from a 
tassel!” We talked about how we both spent much of our lives ‘swinging from a tassel’, and one 
of us inadvertently changed the metaphor from ‘swinging’ to ‘dangling’. It seems that when 
ideas are flowing, the creative process feels like swinging. But when they dry up it can feel as if 
you are dangling, alone, in darkness.  
This chapter begins with an investigation into the prevalence of experiences of 
depression, alienation, and self-abuse amongst the highly creative, focusing primarily on creative 
writers, followed by a speculative exploration of some subjective aspects of such experiences. 
After this journey to the dark side, it may be uplifting to see that Mother Nature may have a few 
tricks up her sleeve to minimize the extent to which we succumb to the negative aspects of 
creativity while still benefiting from its riches. Finally, we discuss another sobering aspect of 
creativity—the fact that many of our inventions are dangerous to ourselves, our planet, and the 
other living things we share it with—and discuss how a creation intimately reflects the structure 
of the worldview(s) of its creators.  
 
IN THE FERTILE SHADOWY SWAMPLANDS OF THE CREATIVE MIND 
The tassel metaphor with which we began this chapter is not atypical of metaphors of the 
creative process. Things attached to ropes or strings figure prominently because they entail both 
freedom and constraint: the freedom to depart from the masses, and the constraint that you can’t 
depart too far. As another example, a creative writing student recently told of how she once 
wrote a poem in which she was standing on a seashore with long strings attached to her fingers. 
At the end of each string was a bird, and the birds flew over the sea while she played and tugged 
at them with her fingers. Years later, in therapy, she had a sudden vivid memory of going 
through a traumatizing childhood event during which she had felt as if she had sprung apart into 
fragments and all the fragments were birds. She believes that in writing the poem she tapped into 
this powerful memory of pain and loss. The poem exemplifies the tension between freedom 
(symbolized by the birds) and constraint (symbolized by the strings) that is intrinsic to creativity, 
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and illustrates as well how a work of art can have roots in the dark, fragmented places of the 
creator’s psyche. 
It is often suspect in critical circles to foreground biographical forces impinging on a 
work of art, and critics tend to foreground social forces and the discourses of race, class, and 
gender as devices to understand art. Most artists prefer to say that the created work of art has a 
life of its own outside of their lives—the story is the thing, not the storyteller. Nevertheless, they 
admit to drawing extensively from the wellspring of personal experience, and to dredging up 
great pain in the process that they cannot control or deal with. Indeed creative individuals are 
more emotionally unstable and prone to affective disorders such as depression and bipolar 
disorder, and have a higher incidence of schizophrenic tendencies than other segments of the 
population (Andreason, 1987; Flaherty, 2005; Jamieson, 1989, 1993). They are also more prone 
to suicide (Goodwin & Jamieson, 1990), and to abuse drugs and alcohol (Goodwin, 1988, 1992; 
Ludwig, 1995; Norlander & Gustafson, 1996, 1997, 1998; Rothenberg, 1990). Classic 20th 
century examples are the many mid-century American poets who wrote so-called ‘confessional’ 
works and committed suicide, such as Sylvia Plath and Anne Sexton. Other famously creative 
individuals who committed suicide include writers Ernest Hemmingway, Virginia Woolf, David 
Foster Wallace, Thomas Disch, musicians Jimi Hendrix, Kurt Cobain, and Janice Joplin, painter 
Van Gogh, photographer Diane Arbus, abstract expressionist Mark Rothko, and mathematician 
Alan Turing. More recently, Heath Ledger seems to have gone so deeply into the ‘other’ with his 
vivid portrayal of the sociopathic Joker in the latest Batman movie that he was unable to recoil 
from the darkness in himself. Novelist William Styron’s memoir of his depression, Darkness 
Visible, provides a comprehensive list of suicidal and depressed artists (Styron, 1990, p. 35-36) 
and also details his own struggle with suicidal thoughts with his eventual realization that most of 
his art had been tinged with his struggle for mental stability (p. 78-79).  Styron remarks that 
“[t]hrough the course of literature and art the theme of depression has run like a durable thread of 
woe” (p. 82). Thus art and its creation appear to have a powerful connection to mental illness, 
depression, and violent energies.  
What comes first, the disturbance or the art? It is a chicken and the egg question. Some 
are convinced that it is the making of art that causes the disturbance. In an essay titled ‘The Keys 
to Dreamland,’ Northrop Frye (1963) notes that “[an author’s] life may imitate literature in a way 
that may warp or even destroy his social personality” (p. 36). Advocates of this position believe 
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that creative endeavors loosen the bonds that keep the pain we all feel at bay. As visual artist 
George Braque is widely quoted as having said, “Art is a wound turned to light”. Artists must 
delve deeply into the subconscious or the intuitive; dark associations and thoughts are brought to 
the surface. In non-artists, these feelings remain undisturbed and latent. They are not mined for 
material. 
Others, however, are convinced that it is the disturbance that causes the art, i.e. that the 
art arises from mental pain. A happy, well-adjusted person might not have as compelling a story 
as a damaged or wounded person, or possibly have fewer resources of powerful emotion to draw 
upon. Freud would have said it was the disturbance that caused the art, but that the ‘disturbance’ 
is not necessarily unique to the artist, just uniquely available. The artist is less liable to block or 
repress negative emotions, and thus has more creative associations, and self-permission to dwell 
in and explore them. A slightly more complex explanation for the relationship between creativity 
and mood disorders is that in a negative affective state one is more thwarted, more driven to 
solve a problem or express oneself, and thus one forges stronger associations in memory. Later 
on, when one returns to this negative affective state, one has access to richer web of associations 
to draw upon. Thus it isn’t a simple question of which causes the other; one enters a positive 
feedback cycle in which the negative state inspires the art but the desire to create art pulls one 
back into the (richly fertile) negative state.  
A classic example of how darkly surprising the result can be is Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein. Here the creative artist delves deeply into the grave, into death itself, to create 
“life” which turns out to be a monster. The well-known feminist reading of this novel by Ellen 
Moers (1976) suggests that Shelley, a young woman of nineteen in an era when childbirth was 
deeply associated with the death of the mother or infant, through her worldview was needing to 
understand her terrors and her anger around her pregnancies (Moers, 1976, pp. 91-99).  Much 
literary theory about Frankenstein and other “gothic” novels, especially by women, theorize that 
this particular form of the novel is the result of women’s worldviews entering the literary realm: 
“The Hispanic feminist theorist Gloria Anzaldúa has argued that one of the byproducts of being a 
woman in a patriarchy is social and cultural alienation, and that one of the consequences of being 
‘pushed out of the tribe’ is the development of a heightened artistic sense or the drive to create 
cosmos out of chaos” (Hoevler, 2007, p. 62).  Feminist critics have argued that Frankenstein and 
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other late 18th century and early 19th century gothic novels illustrate this psychic strategy 
(Hoeveler, 2007, p. 62). 
The Self-Made Worldview 
We believe that further insight into this issue can be gleaned by introducing the notion of a 
worldview: one’s internal mental model of reality, or distinctive way of ‘seeing and being in’ the 
world. A human worldview is a unique tapestry of understanding that is autopoietic in that the 
whole emerges through interactions amongst the parts. It is also self-mending in the sense that, 
just as injury to the body spontaneously evokes physiological changes that bring about healing, 
events that are problematic or surprising or generate cognitive dissonance spontaneously evoke 
streams of thought that attempt to solve the problem or reconcile the dissonance (Gabora, 1999, 
under revision). One could say that creative works are the external manifestation of the self-
mending aspect of a worldview. The painting, novel, or technological feat is the tangible 
evidence left behind of a mind’s struggle to resolve a feeling of tension or imbalance, or mend a 
gap in one’s worldview.  
According to the honing theory of creativity, a creator’s understanding of the problem is 
honed as it is considered in the context of various facets of this worldview, and the worldview in 
turn transforms in response to ongoing shifts (ranging from imperceptible to revolutionary) in the 
conception of the problem (Gabora, under revision). A worldview is said to be self-made to the 
extent that its contents have been honed. In other words, individuals with self-made worldviews 
don’t simply acquire knowledge; they make it their own, reframe it in their own terms, relate it to 
their own experiences, put their own slant on it, adapt it to their needs, and familiar modes of self 
expression. The reclusive and radical American poet, Emily Dickinson, who famously says “Tell 
all the Truth but tell it slant— “ (Dickinson Poem # 1129, line 1), is an example of a creative 
artist who completely reframed traditional poetics to convey her worldview of a godless 
Universe, the nature of female passion, and various other unconventional social and 
philosophical concepts. As Dickinson keenly recognized at the other extreme are individuals 
whose worldviews are not self-made at all but an inventory of socially transmitted information. 
(At a talk one of us recently gave at Harvard, a member of the audience suggested that an 
individual at this end of the spectrum be referred to as a ‘world-made self’.)  
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The notion of a self-made worldview is discussed at length elsewhere; here let us focus 
on how it relates to the dark side of creativity. Since individuals with self-made worldviews have 
a deeply engrained habit of thinking for themselves, their perspectives and behavior come to 
deviate from that of society at large. They tend to be perceived by some as interesting, while to 
others they are threatening or simply exasperating because they do everything their own way 
instead of the ‘right way’. To the extent that they feel alienated from society they have little 
interest in how it measures success, so time and energy goes into the creative projects that are a 
source of not just passion in life but feelings of connection to something beyond oneself. While 
peers are assuring themselves a place in society by rooting their worldviews ever deeper into the 
fabric of consensus reality, the self-made individual is ‘swinging from tassels’ that have only the 
most tenuous link to worldly affairs. These projects often yield little in the way of immediate, 
well-defined outcomes, so the self-made individual may come across as someone with an 
unwarranted degree of confidence—someone with few tangible accomplishments who has not 
assimilated the ‘proper way’ of doing things. Creative artists sometimes minimize their social 
and personal difficulties by consoling themselves with myths about creative people as being 
“born geniuses,” “eccentric” etc., myths, as Rothenberg (1990) says, the creative artists may 
perpetuate themselves (p. 38). 
While a self-made individual craves, like anyone does, to be welcomed and accepted and 
appreciated for who they are, a vicious cycle can set in, one that may set the pattern for the rest 
of their life. The more engrossed they become in their creative projects, the less connected they 
feel, so the less effort goes toward worldly matters, so the more they deviate from norms and the 
less they ‘measure up’, so the more they take solace in creative projects, a solace reinforced by 
the need for solitude in order to create (Piirto, 2005, p. 18). The tragic result is that although self-
made individuals clearly have much to offer, they often do not live up to their potential or if they 
do live up to their creative potentials, their personal lives can be compromised. However, 
because they often dedicate their lives to tending and nurturing creative work—their tassel—if 
they do manage to climb up and haul that it onboard, it may well be a thing of spectacular beauty 
quite unlike anything the world has seen before. Identifying self-made individuals, making them 
feel they’re not alone, and suggesting how they might carry out their projects or explore their 
ideas in ways that are consistent with society’s aims would go a long way toward mending a 
wound in society and bestowing it with the rich gifts that such individuals have to give.  
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The Adjacent Possible 
Creative individuals may be perceived as risk-takers, though of course a move that appears risky 
to one who is not intimately familiar with the domain may not be risky at all to one who knows it 
well. Creative types do not just learn about a domain through experience, but extrapolate from 
experiences of what is to flesh out a framework for what could be. (Given how those threads 
look and feel and interact with other threads in the fabric of reality, what would they be like if 
they extended all the way out here?) This is sometimes called the realm of potentiality (Gabora 
& Aerts, 2005, 2007). Stuart Kauffman (2008) refers to it as the adjacent possible.  
Of course some possibles are more adjacent than others; most people more readily 
conceive of painting a house a different color, for example, than of creating a world of fictional 
characters or developing a new branch of mathematics. Emily Dickinson, we would argue, 
dwells in the ‘deep end’ of the adjacent possible’. She is always gesturing towards the realm of 
potentiality: “I dwell in Possibility— / A fairer House than Prose—/ More numerous of 
Windows—/ Superior— for Doors—“ (Dickinson, Poem # 657, lines 1 -4). Like many of her 
poem, this one ends with her characteristic punctuation mark, a dash, so that we are left dangling 
and swinging in some odd resonance of meaning and energy. Indeed, the nearly overwhelming 
number of dangling dashes here makes for a kinetic reading. She seems to use the dash as a way 
of suspending time and meaning over a mysterious void, as if she realizes she is “out there.” A 
reader feels an intense reaching out for threads of connection, for what could be possible, the 
opening of windows of new perception and doors to new places. One could say she created a 
poetic of ‘swinging from a tassel on the fabric of socially constructed reality’. Dickinson shows 
the creative process as being one of intense connectivity and leaps through uncharted adjacent 
territory. However, the danger of making constant leaps into the unknown and unexplored is that 
she not only dwelt in possibility but she “lived on Dread—/ To Those who know/ The Stimulus 
there is/ In Danger— Other impetus/ Is numb— and Vitalless” (Dickinson, Poem #770, lines 1-
5).  The writer needs to take these risks or ends up in dull, dead space. Interestingly, when one’s 
soul is spurred to take risks, she says, it goes “without the Spectre’s aid/ Were Challenging 
Despair.” (lines 9- 10). Although she is typically difficult here, she seems to suggest that leaping 
to fearful places, while keeping one in a state of dread and fear, is a challenge to despair of the 
soul—thus she lives on dread, not in it.  
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 Creativity is also associated with “defocusing” (Ansburg & Hill, 2002). Perhaps one is 
just defocused with respect to consensus reality because the focus is on the adjacent possible 
(Gabora, under revision). That is, the self-made individual may have a blurred conception of 
what is actually going on around him or her while honing what could be. This is a vulnerable 
state. Being attuned to the halo of possibility associated with all things, events, and people, may 
involve making the boundaries of the self are more porous and fragile, being overly intuitive or 
empathic. Without wanting to overemphasize potentially simplistic psychobiographic 
assumptions, this could be one reason why Dickinson became a recluse, refusing to see anyone 
but close family and very few friends. Such people are vulnerable, too, in a more concrete sense; 
clearly it’s easier to pickpocket, or simply manipulate, someone who is gazing into the stars and 
contemplating life elsewhere in the universe than someone who is alert to danger.  The incredibly 
prolific fiction writer P. G. Wodehouse lived so immersed in his fantasy world, he ended up an 
unwitting stooge of the Nazis. (See See Orwell’s essay “In Defense of P.G. Wodehouse.”) Thus 
another dark side of creativity is that one is susceptible to not just affective disorders but also 
worldly dangers, and this may be directly related to the degree to which thoughts deviate from 
the here and now. To continue with our metaphor, the longer the string on which the tassel 
hangs, the larger the arc it carves out as you swing through the adjacent possible, and the less 
adjacent it is when you’re not swinging but dangling.  
 
The Allure of Darkness 
Frye (1963) provides an insightful view of the writer’s relationship to his or her material. The 
traditional conventions of literature and drama are comedy and tragedy—the conventions of 
literature have both a light and a dark side, as if in acknowledgement that imaginative life and its 
expression through literature have this duality. Frye says that the literary imagination is 
“vertical” in perspective—instead of looking out horizontally across the field of every day life, 
the allure of great literature is that it plummets the depths and reaches for the heights of emotion 
and human action (p. 40), the two great halves of the imagination.  More recent literary theory 
also posits this duality in the creative process itself. Theorist Julia Kristeva identifies creativity 
arising out of a tension between the semiotic (disrupting, fracturing) and the symbolic (ordering, 
linearity) (Kristeva, 1984). Although some may quarrel with Kristeva’s metaphorically 
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gendering these drives, it is striking how often the metaphors of depth and height, or order and 
chaos are used to talk about the creative process. Some artists speak of being struck by 
inspiration from above (hence the metaphor of the Muse); others will speak, as Coleridge does, 
of mining deeply into dark energy.  In Coleridge’s “Kubla Khan”, which is a great poem about 
the creative process, creative energy comes from a great chasm. Coleridge uses language that 
suggests poetic energy derives from a dangerous, disruptive and painful place: “savage”, 
“enchanted”, “demon”, “wailing” “haunted”.  However, the energy from this fountain of power 
is controlled and moderated. Coleridge calls the river that flows from this fountain of energy 
“Alph, the sacred river.”  There is little doubt that “Alph” denotes beginning or origin, but it also 
alludes to the “alphabet” or writing in particular. The sacred river of poetry has its origins in the 
demonic and savage fountain but is nevertheless bound by fences and gardens: 
So twice five miles of fertile ground 
With walls and towers were girdled round : 
And there were gardens bright with sinuous rills, 
Where blossomed many an incense-bearing tree ; 
    (Coleridge, “Kubla Khan” lines 7 -9) 
Those versed in prosody will note that the “twice five miles” of fences with the vertical towers 
and horizontal walls is a visual analogue of poetry’s iambic pentameter. If you remember your 
scansion marks from school days, iambic pentameter is a weak beat (a horizontal mark) followed 
by a strong beat (a nearly vertical mark.) And just as the poem delivers this visual cue, the line 
changes from galloping tetrameter to orderly iambic pentameter. Thus, the poem enacts the 
creation of a poem even as its topic is about the creation of a poem. The image of the “sinuous 
rills” takes us back once again to the strings and ropes of creative energy (strings that are later 
figured again with the dulcimer and the demonic poet’s “floating hair.”) Coleridge’s image for 
the finished work of art is a “stately pleasure dome” which is built over the river as it plunges 
towards subterranean depths.  Art, he proposes, is a balance between light and dark forces: 
The shadow of the dome of pleasure 
Floated midway on the waves ; 
Where was heard the mingled measure 
From the fountain and the caves. 
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It was a miracle of rare device, 
A sunny pleasure-dome with caves of ice ! 
  (Coleridge, “Kubla Khan”, lines 31- 36 ) 
 
While the work of art, that “miracle of rare device,” delivers the balance between creative 
energy and constraining form, the author or creator personally may not maintain that balance. 
“Kubla Khan” does not end with an image of the glorious pleasure dome, but with the image of 
the possessed poet of whom everyone should “Beware!”  Coleridge, as his biographer Richard 
Holmes says, went through profound crises: “a collapsed marriage, a failed career, addiction to 
drugs, a disastrous love affair, and terrible moments of suicidal despair and sloth” (Holmes, 
1982, p. v) and much of his work is unfinished. This raises the question of how artists deal with 
the consequences of being open to both ecstatic inspiration and deep mining into the darkness. 
Coleridge’s image of the artist in full flight, with that floating, dangling hair, is one of demonic 
possession. Kristeva, in her book Black Sun, links depression and creative process in a despairing 
cycle or feedback loop, positing that “loss, bereavement, and absence trigger the work of the 
imagination and nourish it permanently as much as they threaten it and spoil it” (p. 9).  She 
suggests that the energy of loss at the heart of the creative process is both harmful and nurturing. 
There is no way to avoid damage when obeying the creative urge. 
Interestingly, many critics have analyzed the consequence of emotions on the reader, 
going back to Aristotle’s Poetics when he talks of the purging effect of tragedy. Northrop Frye’s 
example comes from King Lear—when Gloucester’s eyes are gouged out on stage, the audience 
is safe in the sense that they know they do not have to jump out of their seats and call the police; 
it is “just an act.” The power of this scene, Frye says, is that the reader or the audience ideally 
becomes filled with “exuberant horror, full of the energy of repudiation” (p. 41). Susan Sontag 
identifies that Virginia Woolf felt there was a similar moral purpose in looking at war 
photographs (Regarding the Pain of Others 2003, p. 6). However, as articulate and sensitive as 
all these writers are about the effect of violent or dark images on an audience, Aristotle, Sontag 
nor Frye talks about the effect on the artist of imagining or witnessing horror. The inner effects 
on the artist of creating works that reveal pain, torture, suffering is untouched. If the artist has 
rendered the scene or image convincingly, with pen and imagination, or has painted the flayed 
flesh of a victim, how is the artist affected? A reader or watcher can turn away, or respond to an 
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implied purpose for the work of art such as repudiating or protesting suffering, or simply 
acknowledging pain’s human universality, or working up sympathy and tears. But what about the 
effect on the artist? The writer must, to some degree, internalize this horror in order to write 
about it convincingly. Does the artist who confronts horrors in the world or in the self need the 
consolation of self-medicating drugs or drink? Is sustained creative practice a dangerous act, 
because as Rothenberg suggests, creative people engage in “a gradual unearthing of unconscious 
processes” (p. 126)? This process may be damaging to the self, but it may also be cathartic and 
cleansing, for in the telling of the story the writer’s worldview is reforged into what may be a 
more coherent or encompassing internal reflection of the world. Margaret Atwood, in her book 
Negotiating with Dead: A Writer on Writing, speaks of the artist’s “desire to make the risky trip 
to the Underworld” (p. 156) for the “story is in the dark” (p. 176.) She has an entire chapter 
devoted to how it is “easy to go there, but hard to come back” (p. 180.) Her metaphor of the 
journey to the Underworld for this process underscores the social and personal value of the 
descent into the dark. Returning from the Underworld with stories, with the message from the 
dead or with self-knowledge, is the pay-off. William Styron ends his memoir with a subdued 
feeling of hope that artists will continue trying to see clearly “depression’s dark wood” and 
finishes the book with a quote from Dante who, after reforging an entire universe of hell, 
purgatory and heaven, says: “And so we came forth, and once again beheld the stars” (p. 84).  
 
DIMINISHING THE DARK SIDE 
Are there natural forces at work to minimize the negative aspects of creativity? A simplistic 
answer is that because, as discussed above, creative people tend to be more emotionally unstable, 
and thus more likely to do themselves in with drugs, alcohol, or suicide, and thus any genetic 
basis for their creative tendencies is less widely represented in successive generations. Indeed 
studies indicate that they raise fewer children (Harrison, Moore, & Rucker, 1995). Thus there 
may well be selective forces that reduce creativity in human populations. However, such forces 
throw the baby out with the bathwater. In this section we discuss evidence for two natural 
processes that enable us to taste the fruits of creativity while eating as little as possible of the 
sour rind. The first operates at the level of the individual, and the second at the level of a social 
group.  
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Adapting our Mode of Thought to the Situation 
Converging evidence suggests that we engage in two forms of thought, or that thought lies on a 
spectrum from convergent or analytic to divergent or associative (Arieti, 1976; Ashby & Ell, 
2002; Freud, 1949; Guilford, 1950; James, 1890/1950; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Kris, 1952; Neisser, 
1963; Piaget, 1926; Rips, 2001; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000; Werner, 1948; Wundt, 
1896). In analytic thought, memory activation is constrained enough to hone in and perform 
logical mental operations on the most clearly relevant aspects. Associative thought enables 
obscure (but potentially relevant) aspects of the situation to come into play. Thus in an analytic 
mode of thought the concept GIANT might only activate the notion of large size, whereas in an 
associative mode the giants of fairytales might come to mind. This is sometimes referred to as 
the dual-process theory of human cognition (Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Evans & Frankish, in 
press) and it is consistent with current theories of creative cognition (Finke, Ward, & Smith, 
1992; Gabora, 2000, 2002, 2003, under revision; Smith, Ward, & Finke, 1995; Ward, Smith, & 
Finke, 1999). Associative processes are hypothesized to occur during idea generation, while 
analytic processes predominate during the refinement, implementation, and testing of an idea.  
 It has been proposed that during the Middle Upper Paleolithic we evolved the capacity to 
subconsciously shift between these modes, depending on the situation, by varying the specificity 
of the activated cognitive receptive field (Gabora, 2003, 2007; for similar ideas see Howard-
Jones & Murray, 2003; Martindale, 1995). This is referred to as contextual focus1 because it 
requires the ability to focus or defocus attention in response to the context or situation one is in. 
Defocused attention, by diffusely activating a broad region of memory such that everything 
seems to be related in some way to everything else, is conducive to associative thought. Focused 
attention, by activating a narrow region of memory and treating items as distinct chunks that can 
be readily operated upon, is conducive to analytic thought. Once it was possible to shrink or 
expand the field of attention, and thereby tailor one’s mode of thought to the demands of the 
current situation, tasks requiring either convergent thought (e.g. mathematical derivation), 
divergent thought (e.g. poetry) or both (e.g. technological invention) could be carried out more 
effectively. And once it was possible to think like this, as with any new technology, human 
beings wanted to play with it: art is an activity that constantly shifts from and plays between 
                                                
1 In neural net terms, contextual focus amounts to the capacity to spontaneously and subconsciously vary the shape 
of the activation function, flat for divergent thought and spiky for analytical. 
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associative and analytic thought. Through the play of art, artists expand the bounds of these 
cognitive functions: a poet wants the listener or reader to think both giant (big) and giant (fairy 
tale) when the word is mentioned in a poem. As Rothenberg (1990) shows, Dickinson delighted 
in using the double meanings of the words “cleaving” and “raveled” (p. 86-87). When the 
individual is fixated or stuck, and progress is not forthcoming, defocusing attention enables the 
individual to enter a more divergent mode of thought, and working memory expands to include 
peripherally related elements of the situation. This continues until a potential solution is 
glimpsed, at which point attention becomes more focused and thought becomes more 
convergent, as befits the fine-tuning and manifestation of the creative work. Perhaps those who 
are particularly creative are working at both modes simultaneously. The artist must certainly both 
free-associate personal experiences, but also reach to the art itself for its tools and conventions. 
A great artist has incredible facility in both, translating personal experience through conventions 
of the art—the more an artist knows about his or her craft, the more ways this can work. The 
more connotations a poet can cram into the word “giant” the better. More significantly, however, 
artists develop in themselves a sense of this double vision. Margaret Atwood devotes a full 
chapter in her book on writing to explore the essential double-ness of creative artists. She quotes 
Nadime Gordimer as saying the following:  
Powers of observation heightened beyond the normal imply extraordinary 
disinvolvement: or rather the double process, excessive preoccupation and 
identification with the lives of others, and at the same time a monstrous 
detachment…. The tension between standing apart and being fully involved: that is 
what makes a writer. (qtd. in Atwood, p. 29) 
Atwood’s book on writing, in fact, spends a great deal of time looking with a sort of horrified 
fascination at the detached and cold stance of the empassioned, devoted artist, the double life of 
being engaged in the world and necessarily outside of it. This is another dark side of the creative 
life, that one is always at the service of the art, even in moments of terrible crisis. Many artists 
will tell you—as Atwood does (p. 120-121)—that in the midst of a great trauma, one small part 
of them is thinking “How can I use this in my art?” This coldness or detachment, then, is one 
way artists protect themselves from the dark side.  
In sum, there appears to be a duality at work in the creative process. If the contextual 
focus hypothesis is true, we are able to adapt our mode of thought to the situation we are in. 
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When we are stumped, or need to express ourselves, or break out of a rut, we adapt ideas to new 
contexts and combine them in new ways using a highly creative but potentially emotionally 
overwhelming associative mode of thought. We then engage in a more even-keeled analytic 
mode of thought in which we fine-tune these strange new combinations. In this way the fruits of 
one mode of thought provide the ingredients for the other, culminating in a more fine-grained 
internal model of the world. Thus we get maximal benefit from the bright side of creativity while 
minimizing its dark side, though often not without feeling some guilt at the application of the 
analytic mode on profound human feeling. 
 
Bathing in the Light of Creativity Without Actually Being Creative 
Contextual focus operates at the level of the individual. A second way Nature minimizes the dark 
side of creativity operates at the level of the social group. In a group of interacting individuals 
only some need be creative. The rest can reap the benefits of the creator’s ideas without having 
to withstand the dark aspects of creativity by simply copying, using, or admiring them. After all, 
few of us know how to build a computer, or write a symphony, or a novel, but they are 
nonetheless ours to use and enjoy when we please.  
This can be seen clearly in EVOC, a computer model of how ideas evolve (Gabora, 2007, 
2008; see also Gabora, 1995). EVOC consists of an artificial society of neural network-based 
agents that don’t have genomes, and neither die nor have offspring, but that can invent, assess, 
imitate, and implement ideas for actions, and the fitness or utility of their actions thereby 
gradually increases. Agents have an unsophisticated but functional capacity to mentally simulate 
or assess the relative fitness of an action before actually implementing it (and this can be turned 
off). They are also able to invent strategically and intuitively, as opposed to randomly, building 
up ‘hunches’ based on trends that worked in the past (and this too can be turned off). This is 
possible because of the integrated structure of their neural networks. What is interesting about 
EVOC for our purposes is that it is possible to vary the ratio of agents who are capable of 
inventing new actions, as well as the degree to which these new actions are inventive, i.e. deviate 
from what has come before. If none of the agents are capable of inventing new ideas for actions, 
what happens is absolutely nothing. One could say they all more or less stand around waiting for 
someone else to do something. No new actions come into existence, so their ability to imitate is 
squandered. But if even a relatively small fraction of the agents is capable of inventing, each new 
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invention spreads by imitation in waves throughout the artificial society, eventually reaching 
another creator, who puts another spin on it, and the set of actions implemented becomes fitter or 
more adapted over time. Thus the set of actions executed by the artificial society evolves. This 
model can be seen working in literary and artistic history, where over and over again, a small 
group of innovators in form or style, change the course of the art. A handful of early modernist 
painters and poets in the first decade of the 1900s transformed how poems were written and 
painters painted, meaning that imagism and free verse dominate mainstream poetry now, and, in 
painting, cubism and abstraction, are conventions in visual art. Some would argue that these 
destructive tendencies in art, to throw away the old and embrace the new, are also a “dark side of 
creativity.” As a choreographer (whose name we unfortunately forget) once said: if you’re not 
doing what your predecessors did, you’re doing what your predecessors did. 
 
SUSTAINABLE INVENTION EMERGES FROM A SUSTAINABLE WORLDVIEW 
Some posit that creativity is a deadening process, a means of dominating, of fencing things in 
and boxing them up, creating new conventions that some future innovator has to break, or to kill 
the creative energy and freeze it in a poem or painting. However, as commented upon by Frye (p. 
38) and as seen in a poem like “Kubla Khan”, there is also a highly involuntary, unpredictable, 
and very much ‘alive’ aspect to creativity.  
The relationship between the controlling and out-of-control aspects of creativity was 
clarified for one of us at a regular spontaneous freestyle dance event in Brussels. There were 
many rules: you couldn’t arrive late, you couldn’t talk, and so forth. This seemed unnecessarily 
harsh. After all, people who enjoy freestyle dance go to such places to escape rules! The 
organizer, however, had thought this through carefully. He explained that each rule had a 
specific purpose, contributed to the creation of a space—un cadre, or frame—within which 
something could grow that was not able to grow elsewhere in the world. This clearly was the 
case. By the end of the first hour a strikingly altered state of mind reliably came over the dancers. 
We entered a different world, a world of silliness and glee, of experiencing other people as 
having an angelic nature, or battling tooth-and-claw like prehistoric reptiles. The rules of the 
game had slightly restructured our worldviews in such a way that new possibilities could 
manifest.  
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This may have broad implications for creativity. Our creative expression reflects the 
voluntary and involuntary constraints we impose on how we go about weaving internal models 
of the external world. Artistic forms (narrative structure, poetic form, compositional fields and 
limits) may be inherent safety nets for artists as well as audience. The artistic forms order and 
shape the chaotic content whether in the world around or from the depth of the subconscious. 
They are the ladders or ropes that help the artist in and out of the dark. Emily Dickinson is a 
prime example of a poet who broke every rule in the book in terms of traditional poetry, yet did 
so in a relentless straightjacket of hymn-meter and four line stanzas; rule-bound she wrote poetry 
that prefigures modernist experimental aesthetics by several decades. The rise of the gothic as a 
mode in literature has paralleled the rise of the industrial revolution and the scientific revolution 
and the demands of women and others for equality an age in upheaval. We see humankind’s dark 
treatment of human kind in most literature—magic/ technology is portrayed as having dark side 
throughout literature—magic lamps, Prospero’s magic, and so forth.  
These ideas about the relationship between constraint and freedom may have implications 
for building a sustainable world. Clearly if our creative brains had not evolved, we would not 
have invented the vast array of different ways in which we are polluting, perhaps irreparably, our 
planet. Although we cannot curtail the involuntary, unpredictable nature of creativity, by 
weaving sustainable perspectives and practices deep into our worldviews we may alter the 
trajectories of creative thought processes on this planet in such a way as to nurture creative ideas 
that are in harmony with the world at large. Atwood, in the same chapter that details artist guilt 
over sacrificing human feeling to one’s art, shows that artist’s perspectives can end up providing 
huge social gains: “The eye is cold because it must be clear, and it is clear because its owner 
must look: he must look at everything. Then she must record” (p. 121) Atwood’s final pronoun 
points the way to how the inclusion of women into the formerly perceived male-domain of 
creativity might alter ideas about the nature of creativity and its dark side. New literature by 
women employs other metaphors of creativity besides dangerous chasms and destructive 
breaking and crashing of old boxes. Women are slowly returning the imagery of birth, from a 
woman’s perspective, to the discussion of creativity: although the birth of a monster might have 
been nineteen year old Mary Shelley’s dark fear in 1818, critic Pascale Sardin suggests that 
contemporary writers like Nancy Houston, a Canadian novelist, are proposing new models of 
creative energy: “in her Creation Diary, [Huston celebrates] the artistic possibilities contained in 
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pregnancy and mothering” (Sardin 2007 p. 164). Mothering and birth, though fraught with risks, 
can be positive and fertile metaphors for an organic and nurturing creative power. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter began by outlining some evidence that creativity has a dark side; i.e. creative 
individuals often lead tormented lives, and are more prone to affective disorders, abuse of drugs 
and alcohol, and suicide. We noted that the creative individual has what we referred to as a self-
made worldview, and his or her focus is on the realm of what could be rather than the realm of 
what is.  
The chapter also discussed theoretical and experimental evidence that we have evolved to 
minimize the dark side of creativity while capitalizing on the benefits. First, we engage in 
contextual focus; that is, we adapt our mode of thought to the situation we are in, i.e. convergent 
or analytical thought for most tasks, and divergent or associative thought when we are stumped 
or need to break out of a rut. A second means by which the dark aspects of creativity are 
minimized is that only some individuals in a society are creative. The rest reap the benefits of 
creativity by copying the creator’s ideas without having to face the drawbacks of creativity. 
Finally the chapter explored implications of the fact that if our creative brains had not 
evolved, we would not have invented the vast array of different ways in which we are polluting, 
perhaps irreparably, our planet. We posited that whether or not the creative ideas we nurture are 
in harmony with the wellbeing of our planet or not depends on the structure of our worldviews 
and the dynamical patterns they fall into for weaving narratives and interpreting situations.  
 We would like to end this chapter by inviting anyone who is swinging or dangling from a 
tassel at the edge of the fabric of consensus reality to look around at all the kindred ‘creative 
types’ swinging or dangling from myriad other tassels. Don’t wave at them—you might fall off! 
Just give them a warm, supportive smile as you swing by, hold on tight, and know as you climb 
your way up that tassel that you’re not alone, and that it is with you that the potential for human 
transformation resides.  
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